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Scott: A Survey of Florida Alimony Since Passage of the 1971 Dissolution
JUDICIAL NOTICE: FEDERAL RULE 201

process. The mere existence of the rule will call the doctrine to the attention
of both judges and trial attorneys. 24 3 Rule 201(d), which provides for mandatory notice on request by a party, should result in increased applications to
the courts for the taking of judicial notice. Additionally, Rule 201(c) permits
the court to take judicial notice on its own initiative. The settlement of the
Morgan-Wigmore controversy and the provision of adequate procedural safeguards should alleviate the fears of judges who previously approached the
doctrine with caution. 244 Furthermore, Rule 201 should promote increased
use of the doctrine in the states by providing guidelines for state courts and
by encouraging codification of state judicial notice principles.
The failure to codify judicial notice of legislative facts, however, may have
a detrimental impact on the role of judicial notice. Although the Advisory
Committee intended courts to continue noticing legislative facts as before,
judges may nevertheless have a tendency to apply to legislative facts the
standards for adjudicative facts set forth in Rule 201. The result would be
restricted notice of legislative facts, which would inhibit the judicial reasoning
process, or increased notice of legislative facts without explicit acknowledgment, which would deprive the parties of even minimal procedural safeguards. To avoid both of these undesirable results and to ensure uniformity
of practice within the federal court system, Rule 201 should be amended to
include judicial notice of legislative facts.
The codification of judicial notice represented by Rule 201 is a significant
step toward the needed expansion of the law of judicial notice. The rule
refines the traditional doctrine by introducing into practice the distinction
between adjudicative and legislative facts. Employment of the suggested
approach for making the distinction in unclear cases would eliminate any
confusion that might otherwise arise from the courts' application of this new
approach. A provision for instructing the jury in criminal cases to accept as
conclusive judicially noticed facts and the codification of notice of legislative
facts would further ensure attainment of the meritorious objectives of judicial
notice: prevention of flagrant error and promotion of trial expediency.
CARLA A.

NEELEY

A SURVEY OF FLORIDA ALIMONY SINCE PASSAGE OF THE -1971
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE ACT
-

A radical modification of Florida's divorce law occurred with the enactment of the Dissolution of Marriage Act in 1971,1 which provides for what
is commonly termed no-fault divorce. The purpose of this note is to survey
and analyze alimony awards in the state of Florida since the passage of
243. Bush, Jr., Article lI-Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts, 23 FED. INS. COUN. Q.
,
14, 20 (Spring 1973).
244. Hefflinger, Proposed Rule Broadens Scope of JudicialNotice, 53 NEB. L. REv.

333, 345-46 (1974).
1. FLA. STAT. §§61 et seq. (1975).
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this act.2 This note will consider alimony awarded in the final judgment
and will not cover alimony pendente lite3 nor alimony unconnected with
divorce. 4 After a brief history of alimony in the state, the reported decisions
since the Dissolution of Marriage Act will be examined with attention to the
established general principles of divorce law and the criteria used to determine
alimony. Rehabilitative alimony5 and lump sum alimony,6 particularly the
award of the marital home as lump sum alimony, will be considered, as well
as setoffs against alimony payments and the consideration of adultery in
determining alimony. Finally, some proposed statutory amendments to the
alimony provisions of the act will be discussed.
BRIEF HIsToRY OF ALIMONY IN FLORIDA TO

1971

Prior to 1971, alimony was awarded exclusively to women7 and almost
as a matter of right.8 Passed by the territorial legislature in 1828, the original
Florida alimony act 9 provided that the determination of alimony rested in
the discretion of the chancellor, with the single exception that alimony could
not be given to an adulterous wife. 10 The Florida supreme court decided at
an early date that the right to grant alimony was an incident to the power
to grant divorces." Alimony incident to divorce, or permanent alimony, was
defined by the supreme court in Philan v. Philan1 as "a continuous allotment
of sums payable at regular periods for [the wife's] support from year to
year.' 3 The factors considered in determining the amount of this periodic
payment were the actual income of the husband and his ability to pay.'4 At
2. For the views of a Florida circuit judge on alimony and other incidents of divorce
just prior to the enactment of the new act, see Waybright, The Silver of Hatred: Financial
Aspects of Divorce, 44 FLA. B.J. 134 (1970).
3. Alimony pendente lite is temporary alimony that is awarded pending final judgment
or appeal.
4. Alimony unconnected with divorce is alimony awarded to enforce the husband's
duty to support his wife when the parties are still married but are separated.
5. See text accompanying notes 116-140 infra.
6. See note 141 infra.
7. In cases of insanity, however, the plaintiff requesting the divorce was required
to provide for the maintenance and care of the insane defendant regardless of sex,
although this support was not termed alimony. Fla. Laws 1969, ch. 69-142, §2, at 676.
8. Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719, 722 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
9. Fla. Laws 1828, sess. 7, §§7, 12, at 12, 13.
10. Id. This adultery provision remained in the statute unchanged until 1971. In that
same year, in Pacheco v. Pacheco, 246 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1971), it was challenged as
discriminatory by modern standards. In upholding the constitutionality of the provision,
the supreme court noted that alimony upon divorce a vinculo (dissolution of marriage)
in American law was patterned after the English ecclesiastical divorce a mensa et thoro
(legal separation) since there was no common law power to grant alimony. Therefore,
the "right" to alimony as an incident to divorce a vinculo exists only as granted by
statute. Id. at 780-81. See also H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES

11.
12.
13.
14.

§14 (1968).
Chaires v. Chaires, 10 FLa. 308, 312 (1863).
12 Fla. 449 (1868).
Id. at 456.
Id.
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this time, the court maintained that a specific sum or portion of the husband's
estate given outright to the wife did not constitute alimony, 5 and the nature
of permanent alimony, with respect to the legal liability of the husband, was
an obligation or duty independent of the marital relationship.8
The initial appearance in Florida of the doctrine of special equity occurred
in 1919,7 when the supreme court awarded a wife reasonable allowance for
maintenance and support in recognition of her special equity in the husband's
property.' 8 The supreme court subsequently 9 established a distinction between special equity and alimony. A special equity was described as a vested
equitable property right that the wife is not required to forfeit and which
does not constitute alimony.20 This distinction was important because it
allowed the court to make an award to an adulterous wife who was statutorily
precluded from alimony. 2'
In 1947 the legislature amended the alimony statute to allow lump sum
alimony,22 recognizing a form of permanent alimony previously rejected by
the supreme court. 23 The court complied with the statute by allowing lump
sum alimony but also reaffirmed the Philan definition of permanent alimony.2 4
In the same decision, the court established two criteria for determining an
award of permanent alimony: the needs of the wife and the financial ability
of the husband to supply those needs.25 By this time the court also began
to recognize the theories that marriage was a partnership to which both
spouses contributed and that alimony was a method of reimbursing the
wife to prevent her from becoming a public charge.2 6 Furthermore, the
change occurring in the societal concept of alimony was reflected in Kahn v.
Kahn,2' in which the supreme court introduced the ideas embodied in the
28
concept of rehabilitative alimony.
15. Id.
16. Duss v. Duss, 92 Fla. 1081, 111 So. 382, 585 (1927).
17. Carlton v. Carlton, 78 Fla. 252, 83 So. 87 (1919).
18. Id. at 254, 83 So. at 88. This award reversed a denial of alimony and apparently

was meant to be alimony. Special equity is an interest in property due to substantial
contributions to its acquisition and preservation of funds and services above and beyond
the performance of ordinary marital duties. Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796, 798
(1932). See generally Note, Special Equities in Dissolution Proceedings, 27 U. MIAMI L. Rv.
177 (1972). This doctrine was initially applied solely to wives but later was also applied
to husbands. See Burns v. Burns, 174 So. 2d 432 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965); Francis v. Francis,
133 Fla. 495, 182 So. 833 (1938).
19. Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796 (1932).
20. Id. at 1074, 138 So. at 797.
21. Id. at 1075, 138 So. at 797.
22. Fla. Laws 1947, ch. 23,894, §1, at 539. The section was amended by adding a
final sentence: "In any award of permanent alimony the court shall have jurisdiction to
order periodic payments or payments in a lump sum."
23. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
24. Welsh v. Welsh, 160 Fla. 880, 35 So. 2d 6,8 (1948).

25. Id. at 884, 35 So. 2d at 9.
26. Chestnut v. Chestnut, 160 Fla. 83, 33 So. 2d 730, 731 (1948).
27. 78 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1955).
28. While the court discussed rehabilitative concepts in its assessment of the case,
%itdid not grant rehabilitative alimony; instead, it afirmed the portion of the decree
denying alimony. Id. at 368-69.
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Sixteen years after the introduction of lump sum alimony, the legislature
amended the statute to allow concurrent awards of lump sum and periodic
alimony.29 Prior to this amendment, the courts had permitted the award
only of one or the other.30 A further refinement of lump sum alimony
occurred in Ortiz v. Orti.31 Instead of awarding permanent alimony, the
court provided for lump sum alimony payable in monthly installments in
order to preserve the wife's right to alimony payments against the husband's
estate.32 The pertinent factors considered by the court in determining the
alimony award were the needs of the wife, the ability of the husband to
respond, and the standard of living during the marriage.33
In 1971 the Dissolution of Marriage Act, popularly known as the no-fault
divorce act,3 4 was passed by the Florida legislature, abolishing the former
fault grounds for divorce and the relevant defenses.3 5 This act made several
significant changes pertinent to alimony.36 It introduced rehabilitative alimony
into the statutory law and, in accordance with the 1968 amendment to the
Florida Constitution 37 permitted the award of alimony to either spouse.35
It also provided that adultery might be considered in the determination of
alimony but removed the absolute denial of alimony to an adulterous party. 39
The act further provided that any factor necessary to achieve equity and

29. Fla. Laws 1963, ch. 63-145, §1, at 306. The amendment added to the end of the
last sentence the phrase "or both, in its discretion." This amendment was modified in
1967 but not substantively. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254, §16, at 608. This modification,
inter alia, deleted the phrase "in its discretion" at the end of the last sentence and renumbered the former §65.08 as §61.08.
30. Gordon v. Gordon, 204 So. 2d 734, 735 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
31. 211 So. 2d 243 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
32. Id. at 244. The award provided for a lump sum of $48,400 to be paid in installments of $400 for 121 months.
33. Id. at 245.
34. FLA. STAT. §61 (1975). This statute was modeled after the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §§302(2), 305 (1971). For an evaluation of the no-fault
concept, see FLORIDA FAMILY LAW ch. 21 (Fla. Bar Continuing Legal Education 2d ed.
1972); Honigman, What "No-Fault" Means to Divorce, 51 MICH. STATE B.J. 16 (1972).
35. FLA. STAT. §§61.044, 61.052 (1975). For discussion of the Florida no-fault act and
its effect, see Murray, Family Law: Survey of Florida Law, 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 330
(1974); Murray, Family Law: Survey of Florida Law, 26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 566 (1972);
Church, Faults in Florida No-Fault Divorce, 45 FLA. B.J. 568 (1971).
36. FLA. STAT. §61.08 (1975).
37. FLA. CONsT. art. X, §5 provides: "There shall be no distinction between married
women and married men in the holding, control, disposition, or encumbering of their
property, both real and personal .... ."
38. The previous statute provided that "the court shall make such orders about
maintenance, alimony and suit money of the wife, or any allowance to be made to
her . . . as from the circumstances of the parties and nature of the case is equitable ......
Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254, §16, at 608. The new statute provides that "the court may
grant alimony to either party .......
FLA. STAT. §61.08(1) (1975). Despite this change,
the vast majority of cases to date have continued to award alimony only to the wife.
For the few exceptions, see text accompanying notes 168-171 infra.
39. See generally, Commentary, Alimony in Florida: No-Fault Stops at the Courthouse
Door, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 521 (1976).
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justice could be considered by the court in determining alimony) ° The
constitutionality of the act was upheld by the supreme court in 1973. 41
DISTRCT CoURTS OF APPEAL AND SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EstablishedGeneralPrinciples
A survey of district courts of appeal and supreme court cases since the
passage of the Dissolution of Marriage Act reveals certain basic principles
that are uniformly accepted as "settled law." As provided by statute, 42 the
determination of alimony is within the sound discretion of the chancellor,
and this discretion is very broad in ascertaining both the amount and the
most equitable arrangement of alimony. 43 The decision of the trial court is
presumed correct and should be disturbed only when there is an abuse of
discretion by the chancellor, or the decision is clearly erroneous on the face
of the record.44 On appeal the burden rests on the party seeking to modify
the award to demonstrate either abuse of discretion or error on the record. 45
Another well established principle is also authorized by the current
statute.46 When the trial court has retained jurisdiction, an alimony award
can be modified if such action is justified by a showing of change in circumstances after the effective date of the final judgment. 47 A recent Fourth District
decision, Wilson v. Wilson,-1 emphasized that failure to show a change in circumstances will result in a denial of relief. At the time of adjudication the
wife had no income or income production ability, but the trial court awarded
alimony for only four years on the assumption that she could rehabilitate
herself. In requiring that she be given permanent periodic alimony, the
district court stressed that under the original alimony award, she could
not petition the court for relief if she failed to rehabilitate herself because
she would be unable to show a change in circumstances. 49
The requisite change of circumstances must be substantial, 0 and an

40.

FLA. STAT. §61.08(2) (1975).

41. Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1973). The court also determined that the
act applied retroactively to marriages already in existence at its effective date. Id. at 273-74.
42. FLA. STAT. §61.08(2) (1975).
43. See, e.g., Bosem v. Bosem, 279 So. 2d 863, 864 (Fla. 1973); King v. King, 271 So. 2d
159, 160 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1973); Weston v. Weston, 251 So. 2d 315, 315 (4th D.C.A. Fla.
1971).
44. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Kennedy, 303 So. 2d 629, 629 (Fla. 1974); McGarry v. McGarry,
247 So. 2d 13, 14 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1971); Fishman v. Fishman, 245 So. 2d 258, 258 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
45. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Goldstein, 310 So. 2d 361, 363 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1975); Schultz
v. Schultz, 290 So. 2d 146, 147 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1974); Singer v. Singer, 262 So. 2d 731, 733
(3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
46. F'A. STAT. §61.14 (1975).
47. See, e.g., Bock v. Bock, 302 So. 2d 774 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Plevy v. Plevy, 295
So. 2d 139 (4th D.C.A. Fla 1974); Bloemendaal v. Bloemendaal, 275 So. 2d 30 (4th D.C.A.

Fla. 1973).
48.
49.
50.

279 So. 2d 893 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
Id. at-895.
Calhoun v. Calhoun, 292 So. 2d 624, 625 (4th D.C.A. FIa. 1974).
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adverse change must not be the result of the party's voluntary action.5 ' For
example, in a Fourth District court case the original alimony award was
reinstated because the evidence indicated that the husband's decreased income
was caused when he voluntarily closed his medical practice and made no
52
effort to obtain other employment.
3
The courts usually require that the change of circumstances be financial?
although the ambiguous language of the statute may allow for other changes.",
In most cases the change is financial, but other factors have been pleaded,
such as in a Third District court case5 5 in which a husband sought termination
of his alimony payments alleging increasing poor health as the change in
circumstances. The court held that the factor controlling alimony modification
was financial ability and that no alimony modification was warranted as
long as he had the ability to pay.5 6 The court's refusal to anticipate loss of
income in this case illustrates the generally recognized proposition that the
change of circumstances must have occurred before the court will consider
modification. Thus, a trial court's decree based partially on the possible
future unemployment of the husband was reversed in Bailey v. Bailey.57 Considering that factor too speculative, the district court indicated that the
proper time to seek modification was after the husband became unemployed.58
Criteriafor the Determination of Alimony59

The Florida courts typically refer to the primary criteria employed in the
determination of alimony as "well established." A survey of recent cases,
however, shows that two versions of these primary criteria are currently in
use. The difference lies in whether the standard of living enjoyed by the
parties during their marriage is to be considered. In some cases courts have
stated that the established criteria for awarding alimony are the needs or
reasonable needs of the spouse requesting alimony and the ability of the
other spouse to pay. 60 In other cases courts (often the same courts) with
equal certainty have asserted that the clear requirements to be followed in
awarding alimony are the ability of the non-recipient spouse to pay and
the needs of the recipient spouse, taking into consideration the standard
51.

Kalmutz v. Kalmutz, 299 So. 2d 30, 36 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974).

52. Id. at 37. The court pointed out that, although the husband lacked cash on hand,
he had the capacity to earn a substantial income, and a modification of his alimony payments would be encouraging him to avoid his obligations.
53. Maroun v. Maroun, 277 So. 2d 572, 574 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
54. FLA. STAT. §61.14(1) (1975). This section provides for application for modification
of alimony payments when "the circumstances or the financial ability of either party has
changed ......
55. Osman v. Osman, 280 So. 2d 67 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
56.

Id. at 69.

57. 300 So. 2d 294, 296 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
58. Id.
59. For consideration of adultery as a factor in determining alimony, see notes 209-222
infra and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Hanzelik v. Hanzelik, 294 So. 2d 116, 119 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Tierney
v. Tierney, 290 So. 2d 136, 137 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Roberts v. Roberts, 283 So. 2d 396,
397 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
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of living shared by the parties during the marriage.6' Although the traditional62
and more commonly used former version has been designated as the proper
standard to apply under the new no-fault divorce statute, 63 the latter variation
has also been declared correct under the new act.- When the standard of living
factor is included, the courts have established that it must be the standard
of living that the husband and wife maintained, or were capable of maintaining, without help from third parties.65 The court will infer that the spouse
who established the standard of living has the ability to continue to maintain
his spouse at approximately the same level unless there is sufficient evidence
to the contrary.66
The great majority of cases using the standard of living factor as part
of the primary criteria for determining alimony are from the Third District
Court of Appeal. 67 This same court, however, has also excluded consideration
of the standard of living in some cases.6 8 The distinguishing factor seems to
be the wealth of the parties. Cases that include the standard of living as a
criterion typically involve substantial amounts of money -the parties during
coverture have been accustomed to a high standard of living, and the spouse
who is to pay is wealthy 69 For example, in Carmel v. Carmel,0 the court reinstated the wife's $1,500 per month alimony award although she was
61. See, e.g., Lash v. Lash, 307 So. 2d 241, 243 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1975); Baker v. Baker,
299 So. 2d 138, 140 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Kalmutz v. Kalmutz, 299 So. 2d 30, 36 (4th
D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
62. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
63. See, e.g., Schalk v. Schalk, 285 So. 2d 39, 39 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1973); Thigpen v.
Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583, 585 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1973); Lefler v. Lefler, 264 So. 2d 112, 114
(4th D.CA. Fla. 1972).
64. See, e.g., Hagen v. Hagen, 308 So. 2d 41, 42 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1975); Baker v.
Baker, 291 So. 2d 33, 34 (3d. D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
65. Bob v. Bob, 310 So. 2d 328, 330 (3d D.C.A. Fa. 1975). In this case, since large
contributions by the wife's parents created a standard of living beyond that which the
couple itself could have provided, the court held that the trial court's finding as to
the standard was incorrect. Cf. Silvers v. Silvers, 274 So. 2d 555, 556 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1973),. in which the standard of living during the marriage was based on the husband's
salary as dictated by his family from the family corporations, with the husband
suddenly experiencing a drastic drop in salary after the institution of the divorce
proceedings. Recognizing the influence of third parties on the standard set during the
marriage, the court nevertheless held that this was the correct standard to be considered
and assumed that the husband still had a comparable ability to pay.
66. See Silvers v. Silvers, 274 So. 2d 555, 556 (8d D.C.A. Fla. 1973); Klein v. Klein, 122
So. 2d 205, 207 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
67. See, e.g., Hagen v. Hagen, 308 So. 2d 41, 42 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1975); Baker v. Baker,
291 So. 2d 33, 34 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Royal v. Royal, 263 So. 2d 277, 279 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1972).
68. See Primato v. Primato, 274 So. 2d 568, 569 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1973); Fishman v.
Fishman, 245 So. 2d 258, 258-59 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
69. See Baker v. Baker, 299 So. 2d 138 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974) (husband's net worth
was approximately $500,000, and his income was $133,000 per year); Arnold v. Arnold, 292
So. 2d 384 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972) (husband's gross income was $70,000 per year); Dash
v. Dash, 284 So. 2d 407 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973) (husband's net worth exceeded $1,000,000,
and his income was $61,000 per year). But see Sharpe v. Sharpe, 267 So. 2d-665 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1972) (husband's income was $10,440 per year).
70. 282 So. 2d 6 (3d D.CA. Na. 1973).
.
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earning $7,265 per year. The husband's exact financial worth was not disclosed, but he admitted that it was increasing and that he had the ability
to pay the amount awarded. Detailing the lavish standard of living the wife
had enjoyed during the marriage, the court noted that she dearly could not
maintain that life style on her earning capacity alone.71 Similarly, in Bosemn
v. Bosem,72 the wife's award of $1,500 per month periodic alimony and
$1,000 per month child support was affirmed by the court. The husband's
net worth exceeded S2,000,000, and his annual income was over $100,000.
The court observed that the award was reasonable even though it would
not maintain the extravagant standard set by the husband during the
marriage. 73 Conversely, in Primato v. Primato,74 the husband's income was
only $11,000 to $12,000 per year during the marriage, and the same court
5
made no mention of the standard of livingWhile the Second District Court of Appeal has in most cases not included
the standard of living factor,76 it does not deny the validity of it. For
example, in Sapp v. Sapp,77 the court found that it was within the sound
discretion of the chancellor to consider the ability of the husband to provide
according to the standard of living enjoyed by the parties prior to the
beginning of their marital troubles. Although the relevant facts were not
particularized in Sapp, the previous standard of living was characterized
as "good." 78 In a more recent case, Lash v. Lash,7 9 the Second District court
included the standard of living factor, specifically asserting that where the
need and ability factors had been proved, the husband must support his
wife in a manner "reasonably commensurate" with the standard established
during coverture.8 0 Again, as in the Third District court cases, the standard
of living was high, with the marital home valued from $50,000 to $60,000 and
the husband earning an annual salary of $29,000.81
The First District court, in contrast, has totally excluded the standard
of living factor, even in cases in which the Third District's formula would
warrant its consideration. For example, in Brust v. Brust,8 2 the court did not
consider the standard of living but looked only to the wife's ability to
support herself. Although she had been accustomed to living on $1,194 per
month during the marriage and was now earning only $370 per month, the

71.

Id. at 8.

72. 269 So. 2d 758 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
73. Id. at 762. The court was also influenced by the fact that the husband was
spending $50,000 per year on his mistress and himself.
74. 274 So. 2d 568 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
75. The court increased the wife's alimony award from $15 per week for one year
to $30 per week for one year, for a total amount of $1,560. Id. at 569.
76. See, e.g., Tierney v. Tierney, 290 So. 2d 136, 137 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Kamensky
v. Kamensky, 282 So. 2d 670, 671 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
77. 275 So. 2d 43 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).

78. Id. at 45.
79.
80.
81.
82.

307 So. 2d 241 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1975).
Id. at 243.
Id. at 242.
266 So. 2d 400 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
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84
83
court denied an alimony award. In Roberts v. Roberts, the court stated
that under the no-fault act there is no basis for alimony unless there is
evidence that the wife cannot supply her own needs. The court then assessed
85
those needs in terms of potential for self-support.
This attitude is obviously inconsistent with the philosophy supporting
86
inclusion of the standard of living factor. In Sherman v. Sherman, the Third
District court extended this philosophy by holding that alimony could be
increased by petition for modification where the sole change of circumstances
was a substantial increase in the earnings of the former husband. In Carmel
the court held that it was an abuse of discretion to reduce and terminate
alimony solely on the basis of the wife's recent employment and capacity for
self-support.87 The husband's earnings and net worth had continued to
increase after the dissolution of the marriage, and the court held it was
error for the chancellor not to consider that fact. Since the wife's earnings
were insufficient to maintain the lifestyle established during the marriage
and the husband could afford to pay, the court reinstated the $1,500 per
month alimony award 8 The Third District court went even further in
Punie v. Punie,8 9 in which the wife had become capable of supporting
herself at the level of and possibly beyond the standard of living established
during the marriage. The court held that the chancellor was not bound to
look only at the wife's change in circumstances and approved the continuation
of the alimony award because the husband's financial position had increased
90
substantially more than the wife's.
91
Following a different approach in Sisson v. Sisson, the First District court
emphasized the wife's need based solely on capacity for self-support and
ignored the husband's ample ability to pay. While the husband in that case
had an income of $1,292 per month and assets of $218,700, the wife earned
only $480 per month and had assets of only $1,600. The court nevertheless
92
reversed as "grossly excessive" the $30,000 lump sum award to the wife.
The Fourth District court has generally not included the standard of
94
3
living factor.8 In fact, it explicitly discounted this factor in McRee v. McRee.

83. Id. at 403. See Brust v. Brust, No. 71-696 (Duval County Ct. Fla., April 22, 1971).
84. 283 So. 2d 396 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1973).
85. Id. at 397.
86. 279 So. 2d 887 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
87. 282 So. 2d 6, 8 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
88. Id.
89. 291 So. 2d 23 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
90. Id. In Conklin v. Conklin, 286 So. 2d 236 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973), however, the
Third District court affirmed a reduction of alimony when the husband's income increased
by 25%, and the wife had begun to earn $425 per month.
91. 311 So. 2d 799 (1st D.C.A. Fla; 1975).
92. On appeal, the supreme court reversed the First District, holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion. Sisson v. Sisson, 336 So.,2d 1129 (Fla. 1976). The
supreme court concluded that the key factors are "the need of the spouse seeking alimony
and the ability of the other spouse to pay." Id. at 1130.
93. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Hernandez, 312 So. 2d 466, 467 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1975);
Hanzelik v. Hanzelik, 294 So. 2d 116, 119 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1974); Schalk v. Schalk, 285
So. 2d 39, 39 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
94. 267 So. 2d 21, 22 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1972).
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Although it noted that the wife's standard of living had diminished, the court
stated the criteria for alimony as the need of one spouse and the ability
of the other to pay, stressing that this formula did not mandate an award
maintaining the standard of living established during coverture. 95 While the
court did not require that the standard of living be maintained, it did not
prohibit inclusion of that factor in the deliberations of an alimony award.
Similarly, the Third District court, although a strong proponent of the
standard of living factor, has expressly recognized that consideration of the
standard of living does not necessitate an award of alimony maintaining the
pre-divorce standard.96
Despite its apparent opposition to the standard of living factor, the
Fourth District court has more recently included this factor as part of the
criteria for alimony. In a brief opinion 9 7 that simply affirmed the amount
of permanent alimony awarded, the court specifically referred to "the standard
of living to which the parties had become accustomed during their many
years of marriage." 9 Again, the Fourth District court weighed the standard
of living factor in Kalmutz v. Kalmutz,99 a case that involved a substantial
amount of money, the husband having a net worth of $150,000 and a gross
income of $130,000 per year.
This difference of opinion among the district courts, most prominent
between the Third and First Districts, has not been clearly settled by the
supreme court, which has embraced both sets of criteria. In Firestone v.
Firestone,10° the supreme court expressly affirmed the inclusion of the standard
of living factor in the primary criteria used in establishing the amount of
alimony. Requiring an alimony award of $3,000 per month to be reviewed for a
possible increase, the court admitted that the original award was substantial
but held that its sufficiency must be judged by whether it allowed the wife
to live in a manner reasonably similar to that provided during the marriage.
The court indicated, however, that its holding was to be limited to the facts
of the case and emphasized the very high standard of living during the
marriage and the husband's enormous wealth. 10 1 Subsequently, in Kennedy v.
02
Kennedy,1
the court apparently rejected the inclusion of the standard of
95. Id.
96. Massey v. Massey, 205 So. 2d 1, 2 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967). After concluding that
the husband had established a certain standard of living during the marriage, the court
added: "Nevertheless, it would be foolhardy to assume that he could and unjust to require
him to maintain precisely that standard. It is difficult enough to stretch one income
to provide one home and next to impossible to expand it to a degree to where it can
provide two homes on the same standard as the joint home was established." Id. In

Bosem v. Bosem, 269 So. 2d 758, 762 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972), the Third District court
again recognized that while it was appropriate to consider the standard of living, the
alimony award need not maintain the established standard.
97. Rogers v. Rogers, 297 So. 2d 853 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
98. Id. at 854. This version of the standard of living factor indicates that the court
may have considered the length of marriage a pertinent factor. See text accompanying
notes 109-113 infra.
99. 299 So. 2d 30, 36 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
100. 263 So. 2d 223, 226 (Fla. 1972).
101. Id. at 228.
102. 303 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1974).
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living factor, deleting it from its statement of primary criteria. The court
quoted the Fourth District's contention in McRee that maintenance of the
pre-divorce standard is not compelled and the First District's statement in
Roberts that under the new law there is no basis for an award of alimony
if the spouse is self-supporting.103 Since the wife in Kennedy was independently
iveailthy, the court denied an award of alimony. The holding in this case, -as
in Firestone,was limited to the facts of the case, with the court emphasizing
the reasonable equality of the parties. 10 4 More recently, however, the supreme
court once again affirmed the inclusion of the standard of living factor in
Keller v. Keller.10 5 Characterizing the award as "niggardly" and quoting
06
the court
extensively from Firestone and a Third District court case,
established
of
the
the
luxury
and
wealth
extreme
husband's
the
accentuated
standard of living and held that the 07trial court had abused its discretion in
determining the amount of alimony.
Although the supreme court has not dealt squarely with the issue, it
appears to adhere to the position that the standard of living can be considered when the parties have been accustomed to luxurious living,
particularly where the paying spouse is quite wealthy and the spouse requestT
ing alimony is not. The rationale of the court stems from a belief that
the wealthy party is responsible for having accustomed his spouse to expect a
high standard of living. 08
There is also some indication that the courts consider the duration of
the marriage in applying the standard of living factor. In Firestone the supreme court stated that the case at hand, which involved a marriage of more
than three years, was "not to be confused with the 'marry in June and sue
the following September' situation that would require an entirely different
analysis. . . .""09 The court later quoted this statement in the Keller
decision.2 0 As previously noted, 1 ' the Fourth District court has also concluded that the length of marriage is pertinent. The Third District court,
quoting Firestone, weighed this factor in one case involving a 24-year
marriage." 2 Of the many Third District court cases using the standard of
103. Id. at 631.
104. Id. In this case, the wife apparently could support herself at the standard
established during the marriage without relying on alimony. She was worth close to a
quarter of a million dollars and earning more than $20,000 per year. Id. at 630.
105. 308 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1974).
106. Dash v. Dash, 284 So. 2d 407 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1973).
107. Keller v. Keller, 308 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. -1974). This case came up on appeal

from the Third District court which, in a brief and uncharacteristic decision and without
mention of the criteria being used, affirmed the trial court's award of only $7,200 alimony
to the wife whose husband had a stipul4ted worth in excess of $3,000,000 and a yearly
income of over $90,000.
108. Sisson v. Sisson, 336 So. 2d 1129, 1130 (Fla. 1976); Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So. 2d

223, 227 (Ma.1972).
109. Id. at 228.
110. -3087,So. 2d 106, 108" (Fla.' 1974). The marriage in. this case lasted seven years.
ill. See note 98 :swpa bnd accompanying text.
112. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 267 So. 2d 665, 668 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1972). The court stated
that "this case is not to be confused with a situation ofttimes appearing where there is a
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living factor, however, this is the only one that mentioned the length of
marriage. Additional support for this factor can perhaps be gleaned from
the fact that the Third District court cases excluding consideration of the
standard of living involved short marriages.1

3

The duration of the marriage appears significant only in cases of great
wealth and extremely short marriages. In such cases, the standard of living
would not be pertinent, presumably because the recipient spouse would not
have had time to become accustomed to the lavish marital scale of living. The
primary determinant motivating the courts to consider the standard of living
appears to be the wealth of the parties. In effect, the courts 14 are applying
a double standard, using one set of criteria for the wealthy and another
for the not so wealthy.
RehabilitativeAlimony
Rehabilitative alimony, as previously noted, 1 5 was authorized for the
first time in the 1971 statutory revision-16 The legislature, however, did not
define rehabilitative alimony or distinguish it from permanent alimony,
leaving the courts to determine the parameters of the concept. Historically,
the courts have stated that alimony provisions in this state are based on the
common law obligation of the husband to support his wife" 7 and that the
word "alimony" means nourishment or sustenance." 8 The traditional purpose
of alimony, therefore, was to furnish a former spouse sustenance, nourishment, and generally the necessities of life when that spouse did not have the
ability or resources to be self-sustaining." 9 It has generally been recognized
that the implementation of the no-fault divorce act, which allows alimony
to be granted to either spouse, did not change this concept and that the
120
basic nature and purpose of alimony remains the same.
In keeping with this -concept, the purpose of rehabilitative alimony as
commonly stated by the courts is to provide nourishment, sustenance, and
the necessities of life to a former spouse until he or she is in a position
of being self-supporting.1 t2 Maintenance of a spouse until rehabilitated has
short courtship, short marriage and an effort to obtain a lifetime of independence from
a shipwrecked marriage." Id.
113. Primato v. Primato, 274 So. 2d 568 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973) (three years); Fishman v.

Fishman, 245 So. 2d 258, 259 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1971)
appellant's petition in

marriage . ..

("We have carefully considered

the light of the record showing

the

short duration

of the

').

114. The First District Court of Appeal is an exception because it has not recognized
the standard of living factor. See text accompanying notes 82-85 supra.
115. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
116. FLA. STAT. §61.08(1) (1975) provides: "[T]he court may grant alimony to either

party, which alimony may be rehabilitative or permanent in nature."
117.

Floyd v. Floyd, 91 Fla. 910, 108 So. 896 (1926).

118. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 50 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1951).
119.

Dash v. Dash, 284 So. 2d 407, 408 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).

120. See, e.g., Tierney v. Tierney, 290 So. 2d 136, 137 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Thigpen
v. Thigpen, 277 So. 2d 583, 586 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1973); Lefler v. Lefler, 264 So. 2d 112, 113-14
(4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
121. See, e.g., Dash v. Dash, 284 So. 2d 407, 408-09 (3d D.C.A. Fla. (1973); Lefler
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122
been couched in terms of a supplement to the spouse's own resources,
outright financial support for the duration of an illness or until recovered
from the trauma of the divorce,1 23 and assistance in regaining a "useful and
constructive role in society" through training or retraining.'24 An additional
purpose advanced is to preclude financial hardship on society during the
period of rehabilitation by preventing the individual from becoming a
public charge. 125 Furthermore, the spouse receiving rehabilitative alimony is
expected to make a reasonable effort to become self-supporting. 26 This view
of rehabilitative alimony necessarily requires the ability to attain a capacity
for self-support.' 27 When the spouse is incapable of such rehabilitation,
28
permanent rather than rehabilitative alimony is appropriate.1
A different approach to rehabilitative alimony was expressed by the First
District in Brown v. Brown. 29 Ignoring the wife's capacity for self-support
and the traditional obligation of the husband to support his wife, this view
concentrates on the wife's equal property rights. The majority opinion began
by defining "rehabilitative" as the restoration of property that has been lost. 30
The court then stated that under the no-fault statute,' 3' periodic alimony can
no longer be paid as nourishment or sustenance of the wife, 32 and lump sum
alimony may be used to adjust the financial conditions of the parties. 33
According to the court, the new act permits husband and wife to be partners
in the marriage with equality of rights and responsibilities.23 4 In keeping with
this view of marriage as an equal partnership to which the wife has contributed
and for which she is entitled to reimbursement, the court expressed the opinion
that alimony may be used to adjust the material assets of the parties at the
time of dissolution of the marriage, which would intertwine alimony with
property settlements. 3 5 The court in Brown ordered lump sum alimony as a
rehabilitative award to compensate the wife for her contribution to the

v. Lefler, 264 So. 2d 112, 113 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972); Beard v. Beard, 262 So. 2d 269,
278 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1972).
122. Sisson v. Sisson, 311 So. 2d 799, 800 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1975).
123. Brown v. Brown, 800 So. 2d 719, 727 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1974) (McCord, J., con-

curring).
124. Mertz v. Mertz, 287 So. 2d 691, 692 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1973).
125. Id.
126. Sisson v. Sisson, 311 So. 2d 799, 800 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1975).
127. Kalmutz v. Kalmutz, 299 So. 2d 30, 34 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1974).
128. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 297 So. 2d 117, 119 (3d D.CA. la. 1974).
129. 300 So. 2d 719 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1974).
130. Id. at 724. The concurring and dissenting opinions vigorously disagreed with
this definition.
131. "[I]t is our considered judgment that a new day has been created by the
1971 legislative enactment .. .." Id. at 725.
132. Rather, periodic alimony is mainly to be paid based on the need and ability
criteria with special attention to the possibility of awarding rehabilitative alimony. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 726.
135. For further information concerning property rights under the no-fault act, see
Kulzer, Law and the Housewife: Property, Divorce and Death, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 17-28

(1975).
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marriage and to reimburse her for her rightful share of the property
36
accumulated during the partnership of the marriage.1
In Reback v. Reback,137 the Third District Court of Appeal expressed a
third opinion of the concept of rehabilitative alimony. The court asserted
that since there is no legislative guidance to the proper construction of the
term "rehabilitative," the court must refer to its common definition and
usage, which is to restore to a former capacity. 13s When the term rehabilitative
is applied to alimony, there is an assumption that the spouse had either a
capacity or a potential capacity for self-support that was lost or not developed
during the marriage and that can be restored.13 9 Therefore, an award of rehabilitative alimony is used to allow a spouse to regain such lost capacity. This
concept of rehabilitative alimony is directly related to the recent attitude
toward property distribution that recognizes that both spouses contribute to
the accumulation of marital property even though such contribution may not
be financial. For this reason, the apportionment between the parties of the
property accumulated during the marriage is an important factor that must
be considered in the determination of alimony.140 This position incorporates
both the concept of rehabilitative alimony as restoration of lost assets and
as maintenance of a spouse until such spouse is self-supporting.
Lump Sum Alimony
The 1971 Dissolution of Marriage Act did not change the provision
allowing the award of alimony in a lump sum. 141 The courts have declared
that the purpose of lump sum alimony is to release one spouse from any
further liability to the other after the final judgment is entered.14 2 Since
136.

300 So. 2d 719, 726

(1st D.C.A. Fla. 1974). The wife has been awarded money

and property amounting to a total of $27,700, which included a rehabilitative alimony
award of $6,000. The husband's net worth was $232,848, and his annual income was between
$36,000 and $40,000. The court pointed out that the wife had given up her career as a
nurse on the birth of her first child and had devoted the next 18 years to keeping house

and raising their four boys instead of acquiring a personal estate. Simultaneously,

the

husband was busy accumulating a sizeable amount of property with the intent, at least
for the last nine years, to prepare for the divorce. The court felt that the wife had been
"short changed" and held that the trial court's award of such a small amount of the
assets of the marriage constituted an abuse of discretion.

137.

296 So. 2d 541 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).

138. Id. at 548.
139. Id.

140.

Id. at 544. In this case, the wife, age 56, was awarded a small amount of re-

habilitative alimony that would terminate when she reached 61. The court, noting that
there was no indication that she was employable or would be rehabilitated by that
time and that most of the marital property remained with the husband, found rehabilitative

alimony inappropriate and the small award of alimony an abuse of discretion.
141.

FLA.

STAT. 61.08(1)

(1975).

"In

any award

of alimony,

the

court

may order

periodic payments or payments in lump sum or both." See notes 22, 29-30 supra and
accompanying text. Lump sum alimony is a gross allowance for the maintenance of one
spouse by the other. FLORIDA FAMmY LAW ch. 22.11 (Fla. Bar Continuing Legal Education
2d ed. 1972).
142. See Schalk v. Schalk, 285 So. 2d 39, 39 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1973); Rankin v. Rankin.
275 So. 2d 283 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
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the statute specifically provides that lump sum and periodic alimony may be
awarded simultaneously, 143 the courts do make such joint awards. 44 It is

also generally recognized that a lump sum award can be made payable in

periodic installments, 145 which increases its similarity to an award of periodic
alimony. For example, in a Third District court case the lump sum alimony

was payable over a period of almost 10 years, with jurisdiction reserved to
later consider periodic alimony. 46 The distinction between periodic alimony
and lump sum alimony payable over a period of time is whether the award
is for an amount subject to modification by subsequent events 'or for a
specific, fixed amount.' 47 In Morris v. Morris,14s an award of $25 per week
for four years was held not to be lump sum alimony because the amount was
not specific - a provision of the alimony decree terminated the payments
on the remarriage of the ex-wife.
The courts have generally asserted that lump sum alimony should be
awarded only when some reasonable purpose would be accomplished. Justifications for lump sum awards include rehabilitation and factors such as the
financial position of the spouses, the length of the marriage, or the lack
of children. 149 When lump sum alimony is appropriate for rehabilitative
purposes to sustain the recipient spouse until he has become self-supporting, it
can be awarded instead of permanent periodic alimony. 150 The grant of such
an award may have impbrtant consequences since permanent periodic alimony
terminates on the death of either spouse' 51 or the remarriage of the recipient
143. See note 141 supra.
144. See, e.g., Scialk v. Schalk, 285 So. 2d 39, 39 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1973); King v.
King, 271 So. 2d 159, 160 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1973); Langston v. Langston, 257 So. 2d 625, 626
(3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
145. See, e.g., Owen v. Owen, 284 So. 2d 384, 384 (Fla. 1973); Home v. Home, 289
SO. 2d 39, 40 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Morris v. Morris, 272 So. 2d 202, 203 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1973). See notes 31, 82 supra and accompanying text.
146. Langston- v. Langston, 257 So. 2d 625, 626 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972). The court
affirmed a lump sum -award of $183,750 to the wife to be paid. over nine years and
eleven months.
147. Home v. Home, 289 So. 2d 89, 40 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
148. 272 So. 2d 202 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
149. See, e.g., Keller v. Keller, 308 So. 2d 106, 107 (Fla. 1974); Schalk v. Schalk, 285
So. 2d 39, 39 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1973); Calligarich v. Calligarich, 256 So. 2d 60, 61 (4th
D.C.A. Ha. 1971).
" 150. See Kennedy v. Kennedy, 303 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1974); McRee v. McRee, 267
So. 2d 21, 22 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
151. But see First Nat'l Bank v. Ford, 283 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1973). An award of permanent
alimony' to the 'wife provided that the payments should continue for the wife's lifetime

or until her remarriage and did not expressly authorize such payments to continue out of
the husband's estate after his death. Nevertheless, the supreme court observed that in
view of the provision of §61.08(2) allowing the court to "consider any factor necessary to
do equity and justice" in awarding alimony, it is permissible to bind the estate without
such express agreement if undue hardship'would otherwise result. Id. at 346. If this is
done, the chancellor may consider granting a lump sum out of the estate in lieu of
the spouse's interest. Id. at 345. The district courts disagree as to whether this statement
by the sureme court constitutes binding precedent. In Burn v. Bunn, 311 So. 2d
387, 389 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1975), the Fourth District Court concluded that this part of the
Ford opinion was dictum and thus not binding precedent and declined to follow it.
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spouse.15 2 Lump sum alimony, however, whether in the form of a single
payment or periodic installments, is a property right that vests on the date that
the final judgment is entered. 153 If the payor of lump sum alimony dies, his
estate can be held liable for any remaining amount due. Similarly, a lump
sum award is binding after the death of the recipient spouse. For example,
in MorTis'- the trial court held that an award of $5,200 payable in 208
weekly installments was lump sum alimony and that the remaining unpaid
portion of the award should be paid to the wife's estate after her death. 15
Moreover, in Keller v. Belcher,156 the court held that the husband must continue to pay a lump sum alimony award of $444,000 in monthly installments
of $3,333.33 over a period of 11 years even though the wife remarried less
1 5T
than a year after the dissolution of the marriage.

Award of the MaritalHome as Lump Sum Alimony
Where spouses own property as tenants by the entirety, one spouse's
interest may be awarded to the other as lump sum alimony." 8 This type of
lump sum award, which occurs frequently," 9 is one of two exceptions 6" to
the doctrine that on the dissolution of a marriage the spouses become tenants
in common of any real property previously held as tenants by the entirety' 61
with the right to effect the disposition of such property themselves. 62 This
rule is based on the general principle that the court cannot determine the
disposition of property between the parties as an incident to divorce proceedings unless the parties either have made a property agreement or have
See also Ulbrich v. Ulbrich, 317 So. 2d 460, 461 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1975). But see Rouse v.
Rouse, 313 So. 2d 458, 460 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1975), in which the Third District Court treated
the Ford case as authority for this proposition.
152. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 297 So. 2d 117, 120 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1974); Horne v. Home,
289 So. 2d 39, 40 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974). Periodic rehabilitative alimony shares this
characteristic with permanent periodic alimony in that it can also be modified (including
termination) on proof of a change in the circumstances of the parties.
153. Horne v. Home, 289 So. 2d 39, 40 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
154. 272 So. 2d 202 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
155. The district court reversed the trial court's decision. See text accompanying note
148 supra.
156. 256 So. 2d 561 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
157. Id. See also Home v. Home, 289 So. 2d 39, 40 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
158. See Owen v. Owen, 284 So. 2d 384, 385 (Fla. 1973); Maroun v. Maroun, 277
So. 2d 572, 573 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973). But, in Barrett v. Barrett, 305 So. 2d 260 (3d
D.C.A. Fla. 1974), the award of the marital home to the wife was termed rehabilitative
alimony by the court. The wife, who had been a private nurse, was shot and disabled
by her husband. Since her husband seemed to have very limited funds, the court
recognized that "one income that we are certain that the woman could use to rehabilitate
herself would be her house." Id. at 261.
159. See, e.g., Nevins v. Nevins, 305 So. 2d 63, 64 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Linares
v. Linares, 292 So. 2d 63, 64 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Schalk v. Schalk, 285 So. 2d 39, 39
(4th D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
160. For the other exception, see text accompanying note 172 infra.
161. FiA. STAT. §689.15 (1975) provides: "[I]n cases of estates by entirety, the tenants,
upon divorce, shall become tenants in common."
162. Owen v. Owen, 284 So. 2d 384, 385 (Fla. 1973).
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made appropriate pleading for the partition of jointly owned property.1 63 An
award of lump sum alimony can be made for any personal property
jointly owned""' or any real property held by the entirety. 65 Because the
marital residence is the property most commonly owned by the entireties, the
lump sum award most often involves the marital home.- 6 In addition,
awards of the other spouse's interest in the marital home often include a
grant of the furniture and furnishings of the house. 167 While most such
awards are given to the wife, it is interesting to note that the wife's interest
in the marital home was awarded to the husband as lump sum alimony by
the trial court in Lefter v. Lefler, 68 one of the few cases under the new act
involving an alimony award to the husband. The appellate court reversed,
however, because there was no showing of the husband's need or lack of
ability to provide for himself. 6 9 Similarly, in DeLones v. DeLones,"70 the
court reversed an award to the husband of one-half interest in his wife's
separate property on the grounds, inter alia, that it could not be sustained
as lump sum alimony when his income was approximately the same as his
7

wife's.1 1

The other recognized exception to the general rule that a court cannot
award one spouse's interest in property to the other is one party's establishing
a special equity in the property. 7 2 Since they are based on different
principles,"73 these two exceptions should not be confused as was done in Keller
v. Keller."4 When counsel urged that giving the home to the wife as lump
sum alimony was error because the evidence did not establish a special equity,
the court noted that counsel was not recognizing the legal distinction between
the two doctrines and upheld the award." 5 If the court does not make an
express finding of a special equity or of a lump sum award, it may not
award one party's interest in the jointly owned property to the other. For
example, in Kamensky v. Kamensky,"7 6 the trial court made a lump sum money
163. See Sharpe v. Sharpe, 265 So. 2d 665, 666 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972); Coscia v.
Coscia, 262 So. 2d 254, 255 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972). See note 135 supra.
164. Schalk v. Schalk, 285 So. 2d 39, 40 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1973) (dissenting opinion).
For examples of such awards, see Wilson v. Wilson, 279 So. 2d 893, 894 (4th D.CA.
Fla. 1973) (a savings account).
165. Maroun v. Maroun, 277 So. 2d 572, 573 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
166. See note 159 supra.
167. See, e.g., Waddell v. Waddell, 305 So. 2d 30, 31 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1974); Baker
v. Baker, 299 So. 2d 138, 140 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1974); Kamensky v. Kamensky, 282 So. 2d
670, 671 (2d D.CA. Ea. 1974).
168. 264 So. 2d 112 (4th D.C.A. Ea. 1972).
169. Id. at 114.
170. 297 So. 2d 585 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
171. Id. at 588.
172. See Owen v. Owen, 284 So. 2d 384, 385 (Fla. 1973); Lefler v. Lefler, 264 So. 2d
112, 114 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972). See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text.
173. Schalk v. Schalk, 285 So. 2d 39, 40 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1974).
174. 302 So. 2d 795 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974). See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
175. 302 So. 2d at 796. But see Schalk v. Schalk, 285 So. 2d 39 (4th D.CA. Fla.
1973) (affirming an award of one-half interest in municipal bonds as "additional lump
sum alimony and as a special equity.').
176. 282 So. 2d 670 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1973).
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award but did not specifically designate the award of the jointly held marital
home to the wife as lump sum alimony. On appeal, the Second District court
found that the judgment did not constitute a lump sum award and reversed
on the ground that there was no finding of a special equity. 177 Similarly, in
Venzer v. Venzer, 178 the award of the marital home to the wife as a lump sum
alimony was reversed because the appellate court held that the wife did not
need alimony and that no special equity had been established. 7 9
It is also within the trial court's discretion to award the exclusive use
and occupancy of the marital home to one spouse. 80 This usually occurs
when the parties have retained joint ownership,'" but it can also be awarded
when the spouse not entitled to possession has sole ownership.182 Although
there are exceptions, 183 exclusive use of the marital home is most often
awarded to the spouse who was given custody of the minor children. 184 Such
awards are commonly limited to the duration of the custody, with the right
to exclusive possession terminating when the minor children are grown and
no longer living there. 185 An additional ground for termination of exclusive
use sometimes given by the courts is the remarriage of the spouse. 8 6 In the
majority of cases the recipient spouse is the wife, but in Schneider v.
Schneider,187 the husband was given custody of the three children and was
also given exclusive use of the jointly owned home for as long as he lived
there with any of the minor children. 8 8 Such awards of exclusive use are
often accompanied by a similar award of the use of the furniture and
furnishings of the house.18 9 In addition, there may be a provision for the

177. Id. at 672.
178. 308 So. 2d 544 (Sd D.C.A. Fla. 1975).
179. Id. at 546-47. The wife had remarried a few months after the divorce.
180. Schalk v. Schalk, 285 So. 2d 39, 40 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
181. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Schwartz, 297 So. 2d 117, 118 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Baker
v. Baker, 291 So. 2d 33, 34 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Weston v. Weston, 251 So. 2d
315, 316 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
182. Fligelman v. Fligelman, 272 So. 2d 199, 200 (Sd D.CA. Fla. 1973).
183. See Bernst v. Cotter, 256 So. 2d 529, 530 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972); Weston v.
Weston, 251 So. 2d 315, 316 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
184. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719, 721 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Beard
v. Beard, 262 So. 2d 269, 271 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1972); Landsberg v. Landsberg, 259
So. 2d 727, 728 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
185. See, e.g., Ruhnau v. Ruhnau, 299 So. 2d 61, 63 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Baker
v. Baker, 291 So. 2d 33, 34 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Fligelman v. Fligelman, 272 So. 2d
199, 200 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
186. Ruhnau v. Ruhnau, 299 So. 2d 61, 63 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
187. 296 So. 2d 77, 78 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
188. Id. The trial court later altered the judgment to give the home and its contents
to the wife, although custody of the children remained with the husband; however,
the district court held the amended judgment invalid. See Richardson v. Richardson, 315
So. 2d 513 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1975).
189. See, e.g., Ruhnau v. Ruhnau, 299 So. 2d 61, 63 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Beard
v. Beard, 262 So. 2d 269, 271 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1972); Landsberg v. Landsberg, 259 So. 2d
727, 728 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
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spouse not in possession to pay the various expenses of the domicile such
as taxes, insurance, mortgage payments, and maintenance costs. 190
The Third and Fourth District courts have expressed different views
of the award to one spouse of the exclusive use of the marital home. The
Third District court has not considered use of the marital home as alimony
when the trial court did not so designate it.191 Thus, in Landsberg v. Landsberg,19 2 the wife's right to possession of the marital residence and to the use
of the personal contents was affirmed while the "awards in the nature of
alimony" were reversed.193 Conversely, the Fourth District court has maintained
that award of the use of the marital home always constitutes alimony because
it is an incident of support. 194 Reversing the $50 per week alimony in Weston
v. Weston,195 the Fourth District Court emphasized that the wife would
still have some alimony by virtue of the award of exclusive use and occupancy
of the marital dwelling. 96
Setoffs Against Alimony Payments
Generally, setoffs against alimony payments are viewed with disfavor
because they are based on the different and potentially incompatible purposes
of ensuring fair-dealing in joint business affairs and of providing support
or maintenance for a spouse. 197 The courts have expressly recognized that the
obligation to pay alimony is not an ordinary debt but something more than
a debt. 98 Since alimony is a requirement to pay for a spouse's support
according to the needs of the spouse as determined by the court, the paying
spouse should not be allowed to vary those terms at his convenience. 9" The
test used to determine whether an expenditure should be allowed to be offset
against alimony payments is whether the recipient spouse has unrestricted
control over how the alimony is spent.200 If the spouse does not have such
control, the setoff is not permitted.
190. See Schwartz v. Schwartz, 297 So. 2d 117, 119 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1974); Baker v.
Baker, 291 So. 2d 33, 34 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1974).
191. Fligelman v. Fligelman, 272 So. 2d 199, 200 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
192. 259 So. 2d 727, 728 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
193. Id. These alimony awards included payments by the husband for the mortgage,
taxes, utility bills, and home maintenance and had not been designated as a fixed
amount by the trial court.
194. Bernst v. Cotter, 256 So. 2d 529, 530 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1972). In this case, "no
monetary alimony was awarded to the wife but she was given the 'use and occupation'
of the marital domicile, held by a tenancy by the entireties. . . ." Id. When she remarried,
the ex-husband petftioned to terminate his alimony obligation, to be allowed to collect
rent, and to partition the home. The court agreed, holding that the wife was no longer
entitled to the exclusive use of the home.
195. 251 So. 2d 315, 316 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1971).
196. Id.
197. Chappel v. Chappel, 253 So. 2d 281, 283 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
198. Rankin v. Rankin, 286 So. 2d 573, 574 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1972).
199. Chappell v. Chappell, 253 So. 2d 281, 283 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
200. Id. This test is in keeping with FLA. STAT. §61.11 (1975), which provides: "A
judgment of alimony granted under §61.08 or §61.09 releases the party receiving the
alimony from the control of the other party, and the party receiving the alimony may use
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In Chappell v. Chappell,201 a case of first impression, the court held that
payment of a joint and several income tax liability cannot be setoff against
alimony payments unless there are compelling equitable reasons to the
contrary.202 The wife would not have had the requisite control over expenditure of the support money because the husband had already paid the tax
deficiency to the Internal Revenue Service and wanted a credit against his
delinquent and future alimony payments. There being no compelling
equitable considerations to the contrary in this case, the court reversed the
order that had permitted the setoff.2 0 3 Similarly, in the Third District court case
of Rankin v. Rankin,20 4 the husband was delinquent in his alimony payments
and claimed he was entitled to a setoff because the wife had received more
income than he had from a farm held in common. Because the wife would
not have unrestricted corttrol over how the alimony was spent, the Third
District court held that a setoff for possible business debts could not be
2 5
allowed against alimony. 0
The Second District Court of Appeal in Rankin v. Rankin,2 0 6 however,
approved the setoff of temporary alimony pending appeal against the payment
of a lump sum alimony award. Since the purpose of the lump sum award was
to release the paying spouse from further obligations after the date of the
final judgment, any payments made subsequent to that date must be applied
to the discharge of that obligation. 20 7 The same court in Lash v. Lash2os
likewise permitted a setoff of alimony pending appeal. In that case the
temporary alimony paid was credited against permanent alimony payments
awarded on appeal. Although the court did not mention this as a basis
for its decisions, the payments being offset in both cases had been paid
directly to the wife, which gave her complete control over how the money
was spent.
his alimony and acquire, use, and dispose of other property uncontrolled by the other
party."
201. 253 So. 2d 281 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
202. Id. at 287. For further information on tax considerations, see Note, Alimony:
Income Taxation of Installment Payments, 24 U. FLA. L. Rav. 499 (1972).
203. Chappell v. Chappell, 253 So. 2d 281, 287 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971). The court
considered that the wife had not worked during the marriage, and thus the tax liability
was based on the husband's income. It also stated that the wife had relied on the
husband in perfunctorily signing the joint return. The court pointed out that the
husband, in the event the payment of the tax levy was onerous, had an alternative
means of relief by petitioning for a modification of the alimony award because of a
change in his ability to pay.
204. 268 So. 2d 573, 574 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
205. Id. The appellate court reversed because the trial court had based its decision
on the erroneous classification of alimony as an ordinary debt.
206. 275 So. 2d 283 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
207. Id. at 284. The wife had been awarded temporary alimony pending the divorce
proceedings but had not applied to the court for alimony pending appeal. Thus she
was not entitled to the payments in question. Since the husband had continued to
make the monthly payments, however, there was some question as to whether he had
misled her into not requesting the alimony pending appeal, in which case estoppel
would apply. This issue was declared moot since, by the court's reasoning, the offset would
be allowed regardless of whether the wife was entitled to the payments.
208. 307 So. 2d 241, 244 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1975).
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Considerationof Adultery
The provision in the prior statute prohibiting an award of alimony to
an adulterous wife209 was modified in the 1971 Dissolution of Marriage Act,
which provides that consideration of adultery in the determination of alimony is permissible.210 In keeping with this new provision, the courts have
recognized that a spouse defending against a claim for alimony must be
allowed to raise the issue of adultery as a mitigating defense. 211 Evidence concerning the adultery of the spouse requesting alimony can therefore always
be introduced, and the trial judge may not refuse to allow the issue to be
raised. For example, in Oliver v. Oliver,212 the court, maintaining that
factors pertinent to the determination of alimony awards include the conduct
and misconduct of the parties during the marriage, reversed the trial judge's
refusal to permit the husband, who was defending against the alimony claim,
to present evidence of the wife's misconduct. 21s Once the opportunity to raise
the issue has been given, it is within the court's discretion whether to consider
such evidence in its determination of alimony.214 It is in compliance with
the statute and does not constitute an abuse of discretion for the trial judge
5
to choose to disregard the entire issue of adultery.2
A difference of opinion in the interpretation of the statute exists, however,
as to the introduction of evidence of the adultery of the spouse not requesting
alimony. In Escobarv. Escobar,2' 6 the Third District Court of Appeal focused
on the adultery provision of the statute and held that a trial judge may
decline to allow the introduction of testimony concerning the husband's
alleged adultery when the husband is not seeking alimony. Exclusion of such
evidence did not violate the statute, in the Third District court's opinion,
because the adultery provision only pertains to the spouse seeking alimony.217
The court further stated that evidence of the husband's adultery is irrelevant
since alimony must be based on the wife's need and the husband's ability to
pay.2 18 Conversely, the Fourth District Court of Appeal has taken the position
that the trial judge cannot refuse to hear such evidence. Thus, in Pro v. Pro,219
the court held it was error not to require that the husband in his depositiol
answer the questions pertaining to his alleged adultery. In so doing, the
209. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254, §16, at 608, provides: "[B]ut no alimony shall be

granted to an adulterous wife."
210. FLA. STAT. §61.08(1) (1975) provides: "The court may consider
spouse and the circumstances thereof in determining whether alimony
to such spouse and the amount of alimony, if any, to be awarded
See generally Commentary, Alimony in Florida: No-Fault Stops at the
28 U. FLA. L. Rav. 521 (1976).
211. Stafford v. Stafford, 294 So. 2d 25, 27 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1974).
212. 285 So. 2d 638 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1973).
213. Id. at 640-41.
214. Stafford v. Stafford, 294 So. 2d 25, 27 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
215. Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, 265 So. 2d 77, 78 (3d D.CA. Fla.
216. 300 So. 2d 702 (3dD.C.A. Fla. 1974).
217. See note 210 supra.
218. Escobar v. Escobar, S00 So. 2d 702, 703 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974).
219, 300 So. 2d 289 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1975).
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court pointed to subsection two of the statute, which provides that the
court can consider any factor necessary to achieve justice. 220 According to
the Fourth District court, evidence of the adultery of the spouse defending
against a claim for alimony might well be an influencing factor since the
entire marital picture is relevant to the award of alimony. 22 1 The court
also supported its position with the observation that the legislature could
not have intended to allow the trial court to refuse to hear such evidence
because to do so would make impossible the review of such action as an
abuse of discretion.222
PROPOSED STATUTORY AMENDMENTS

These unresolved differences among district court opinions can be settled
by direct pronouncement of the supreme court in cases presenting the
appropriate issues, but a more efficient method of resolution' is statutory
amendment. Three bills proposing such amendments to the 1971 Dissolution
of Marriage Act have recently been introduced in the state legislature.
House Bill 142223 proposes two changes. It amends the adultery provision
of subsection one of section 61.08 to provide that the adultery of the
recipient spouse be considered in determining alimony. 224 This change
resolves the confusion in the courts over whether consideration of the adultery
of both spouses is statutorily permitted by excluding that of the paying
spouse. In a new subsection, the bill specifies the factors to be used in
deciding the amount of alimony to be awarded.225 This addition is a codification of the need and ability to pay criteria used by the courts to determine
alimony. Significantly, it does not include the standard of living factor.
House Bill 1503226 suggests a supplementary provision at the end of subsection two of section 61.08, which presently permits the court to consider any
factor necessary to achieve equity and justice. Under the proposed bill, when
one spouse's income earning ability has been diminished because he has been
supported by the other spouse during the marriage, the court shall award
permanent alimony to the supported spouse. The amount of the permanent
alimony plus the recipient. spouse's expected income should be sufficient to
maintain the standard of living established during coverture.2

27

By providing

220. FLA. STAT. §61.08(2) (1975) provides: "In determining a proper award of alimony,
the court may consider any facl.or necessary to do equity and justice between the parties."
221. For a fuller discussion of the consideration of adultery as a factor in determining
alimony, see Commentary, Alimony in Florida: No-Fault Stops at the Courthouse Door,
28 U. FI.A. L. REV. 521 (1976).
222. Pro v. Pro, 300 So. 2d 288, 289 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1975).
223. Fla. H.R. 142 (Reg. Sess. 1975, introduced by Rep. Papy).
224. "The court may consider the adultery of a spouse who is claiming alimony.
Id. (italicized words are the proposed addition).
225. "(3) The amount of alimony awarded to a spouse shall be based on a demonstrated need for support, as well as the financial ability of the other spouse to pay such
support." Id.
226. Fla. H.R. 1503, §1 (Reg. Sess. 1975, introduced by Rep. Gordon and others).
This bill, which also proposed a change in the child support provision of §61.13(l), has
been dropped and is now a dead bill.
227. "In the case of a marriage wherein one party contributed all or the preponderate
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for a permanent alimony award, the sponsor attempted to redress the problem
of the supported spouse who is incapable of total rehabilitation. While this
proposed expansion included the standard of living factor, it did so in connection with the supported spouse's decreased earning ability and not in the
28
context of wealth as do the courts.
Identical bills have been introduced in the House and Senate, House Bill
1141229 and Senate Bill 630,230 which propose comprehensive changes in the
alimony provisions of the no-fault statute. This proposed amendment deletes
both the adultery provision of subsection one of section 61.08 and all of
subsection two, which allows courts to consider any factor necessary to
accomplish justice. Focusing on the earning ability of both spouses as the
primary determinant, the bill offers detailed standards for the courts to
follow in the determination of alimony. The spouses are separated into primary
and secondary earners, 23' and the former is ineligible for alimony. The
secondary earner is entitled to alimony only if his earning ability has been
impaired by certain enumerated family or marital considerations, or if this
spouse is mentally or physically unable to be self-supporting, or if he is entrusted with the care of a minor child and in the court's opinion should not
work full time. Once it has been determined that the secondary earner is
entitled to alimony, the amount and terms of the award depend on the
factors previously considered by the court plus the additional factors of the age
of the recipient spouse, the length of the marriage, and the established marital
standard of living. The guidelines also specify that rehabilitative alimony
may be awarded in appropriate situations to allow the secondary earner to
pursue additional training that will increase his earning power.
This proposed amendment suggests solutions to all of the problems
addressed by the other two bills. It solves the problem of the interpretation
of the adultery provision by removing adultery as a permissible consideration.
In its carefully detailed standards the bill codifies the criteria to be used in
deciding whether to award alimony -the needs of the recipient spouse, the
ability of the other spouse to pay, and the expected earning abilities of the
parties. This bill makes specific provision for the spouse who was supported
by the other during the marriage and has thereby suffered a diminution of
earning ability. Following the decision that alimony is warranted, due consideration of the standard of living during coverture is included in determiningthe proper amount of the award. The standard of living factor is not limited
part of support for the other party and because of such support the party having been
so supported has less income earning ability at the time of the dissolution of marriage
than he or she otherwise would reasonably have had, the court shall award the party so
supported with permanent alimony sufficient to supplement the party's expected income
to a degree to maintain him or her in the state to which he or she has become
accustomed during the marriage." Id.
228. See notes 68-69, 108 supra and accompanying text.
229. Fla. H.R. 1141 (Reg. Sess. 1975, introduced by Rep. Rish and others).
230. Fla. S.630 (Reg. Sess. 1975, introduced by S. Scarborough). At the end of the
1976 legislative session, this bill was reported out by the Senate Judiciary Committee. It
is very likely that the bill will be reintroduced in the 1977 session.
231. The primary earner is the party who has the higher anticipated annual income.

Id. §2.
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by these guidelines to cases in which the primary earner is wealthy and the
marital standard of living was luxurious but is applied uniformly whenever
the secondary earner requires alimony. This amendment also provides legislative guidance as to rehabilitative alimony and the basis for its award by
specifying that it be granted for the purpose of training or retraining the
spouse to effect an increase in anticipated annual income. The overall effect
of this proposed amendment is to place the determination of alimony awards
on an economic basis.
CONCLUSION

From an analysis of Florida cases, it is readily apparent that courts have
reached inconsistent results in determining alimony awards. Except in the
areas previously discussed, this disparity does not represent differences in
interpretation or application of the law but rather is the result of the great
discretion afforded the courts by the current alimony statute, which permits
consideration of any factor necessary to do equity and justice.2 32 The courts
have properly interpreted this provision to mean that the entire marital
picture should be considered in determining alimony awards, including the
conduct and misconduct of the parties and the respective degrees of fault in
the disintegration of the marriage. Indeed, the consideration of fault is
23 3
specifically provided for in the adultery provision of the statute.
234
The proposed amendment
to the no-fault divorce law not only resolves
most of the present disagreements among the district courts but also removes
this anachronistic fault concept from the statute. By awarding alimony on a
primarily economic basis, the bill attempts to minimize the present disparity
in alimony awards and allows the courts to accomplish financial justice and
equity between the parties. Although it appears to make a radical change
in the current statute, this bill in fact retains all of the factors that the
courts have been considering with the single exception of fault. Passage of
this bill or a similar amendment would put the determination of alimony on
a basis compatible with the present no-fault concept of divorce - the dissolution of an equal partnership.
SANDRA

232.

FLA. STAT. §61.08(2)

233.
234.

FLA. STAT. §61.08(l) (1975).
See note 230 supra.

R. ScoTr

(1975).
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